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a b s t r a c t
We study atomic routing games on networks in which players choose a path with the
objective of minimizing the maximum congestion along the edges of their path. The social
cost is the global maximum congestion over all edges in the network. We show that the
price of stability is 1. The price of anarchy, PoA, is determined by topological properties of the
network. In particular, PoA = O(`+ log n), where ` is the length of the longest path in the
player strategy sets, and n is the size of the network. Further, κ−1 ≤ PoA ≤ c(κ2+ log2 n),
where κ is the length of the longest cycle in the network, and c is a constant.
© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
A fundamental issue in the management of large scale communication networks is to route the packet traffic so as to
optimize the network performance. Our measure of network performance is the worst bottleneck (most used link) in the
system.Wemodel network traffic as finite, unsplittable packets (atomic flow) [36,41], where each packet’s path is controlled
independently by a selfish player. The Nash equilibrium (NE) is a natural outcome for a game with selfish players — a stable
state in which no player can unilaterally improve her situation. In the recent literature, the price of anarchy (PoA) [27,38]
and the price of stability (PoS) [1,2] have become prevalent measures of the quality of the equilibria of uncoordinated selfish
behavior relative to coordinated optimal behavior. The former quantifies the worst possible outcome with selfish agents,
and the latter measures the minimum penalty in performance required to ensure a stable equilibrium outcome.
We study routing games with N players corresponding to N source–destination pairs of nodes on a network G; that is,
every player corresponds to a source–destination pair. The strategy set available to each player is any set of edge-simple
paths from the player’s source to the destination. For example, the strategy set may consist of all edge-simple paths from
the source to the destination in G, or alternatively, the strategy set could be any strict subset of all the possible paths. A pure
strategy profile is a selection of a single path (strategy) by each player from her respective strategy set. We study pure Nash
equilibria. In our context, a pure strategy profile corresponds to a routing p, a collection of paths, one for each player. We
refer to Nash equilibria in this context as Nash-routings. A routing p causes congestion in the network: the congestion Ce on
an edge e is the number of paths in p that uses this edge; the congestion Cpi of a path pi ∈ p is the maximum congestion
over all edges on the path; the congestion C of the network is the maximum congestion over all edges in the network. The
dilation D is the maximum path length in p.
Since a packet is to be delivered along each player’s path, a natural choice for social cost is themaximumdelay incurred by
a packet. It is well known that the packets can be scheduled along the paths in p in a coordinated way so that the maximum
delivery delay is close to O(C + D) [7,12,28,30,37,39]. In heavily congested networks, C  D, and the maximum delay of
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a packet is governed by the congestion C . Thus, the network congestion is an appropriate social cost — this choice for the
social cost is often referred to as themaximum social cost [10,11,27,42]. Consider player iwith path pi ∈ p. We choose Cpi as
the player cost, since it is shown in [7] that player i’s packet can be delivered in time O(Cpi +|pi| log(Cpi +|pi|)), where |pi| is
the path length; this holds for all players simultaneously. This choice of player cost is typically referred to as themaximum
player cost.
In the literature it is common to use the sum of the player cost (instead of the maximum) [14,15,26,27,33,42], where the
cost is proportional to the sum of the congestions on the edges along a player’s path. However, as discussed previously, in
packet scheduling problems a critical parameter for the packet delivery time is themaximum congested edge along its path.
Intuitively, when a packet is being delivered along its path and at some specific moment the packet waits on a particular
edge to be cleared of other packets, at the same time, the remaining edges along its path may be cleared of their packets,
and thus these edges will not have congestion to delay the packet further. For all these reasons, we have chosen to study the
metrics of maximum player and social cost for the atomic routing games that we consider here.
1.1. Contributions
We give the first comprehensive analysis of routing games with maximum player and social cost. We study the quality
of pure Nash-routings with respect to the price of stability and anarchy.
In our first result, we establish that there exist optimal Nash-routings where the social cost (congestion) is equal to the
optimal coordinated cost; in other words, PoS = 1, where the price of stability expresses the ratio of the optimal social
cost in the Nash-routing with the optimal coordinated cost. We also show that any best response dynamic, a sequence of best
responsemoves of players, converges to a Nash-routing in a finite amount of time. Thus, we can easily obtain Nash-routings,
starting from arbitrary initial routings.
Theorem 1.1. For every routing game:
(i) There is a pure Nash-routing which is optimal (PoS = 1).
(ii) Every best response dynamic converges to a Nash-routing in finite time.
We continue by examining the quality of the worst case Nash-routings. The price of anarchy, PoA, expresses the ratio of
the social cost in the worst-case Nash-routing to the optimal coordinated cost. We bound the price of anarchy in terms of
topological properties of the network. The next result bounds the price of anarchy for arbitrary instances of routing games
in terms of the maximum path-lengths in the strategy sets:
Theorem 1.2. For any routing game where the strategy sets of the players have paths with length at most `, PoA < 2(`+ log n).
Theorem 1.2 gives good bounds for the price of anarchy for networks where it is natural to use paths with short length.
For example in the Hypercube and Butterfly [29], if we choose bit-fixing paths, then ` = O(log n), which implies that
PoA ≤ c log n, for some constant c .
Our next result characterizes the worst case Nash-routing in terms of the longest cycle of the network. For a graph G, the
edge-cycle number κe(G) is the length of the longest edge-simple cycle in G; we will drop the dependence on G when the
context is clear.
Theorem 1.3. For any undirected graph G with edge-cycle number κe,
(i) there exists a routing game for which PoA ≥ κe − 1;
(ii) for any routing game, PoA ≤ c(κe2 + log2 n), for some constant c.
Let m denote the number of edges in the network. Since κe ≤ m, we have that PoA ≤ c · m2. In graphs with Euler cycles,
κe = m. Therefore, Theorem 1.3 implies thatm− 1 ≤ PoA ≤ c ·m2 (we use c to represent a generic constant).
The lower bound of Theorem 1.3 (part (i)) is obtained by constructing a game instance where the players have their
sources and destination on the largest cycle. To prove the upper bound of Theorem 1.3 (part (ii)), we use Theorem 1.2.
We first examine 2-connected graphs and then general graphs. For 2-connected graphs, every pair of nodes has two edge-
disjoint paths connecting them (Menger’s theorem [35]), from which we establish that ` ≤ c · κe2. The cycle upper bound
for 2-connected graphs follows from Theorem 1.2.
If the graph G is not 2-connected, then the relation ` ≤ c · κe2 may not hold. To obtain the result for a general graph G,
we decompose G into a tree of 2-connected components. We show that if in G the Nash-routing has network congestion C ,
then there is some 2-connected component G′ which has congestion close to C . At the same time the players in G′ are in
a partial Nash-routing, where many of them are locally-optimal. A generalization of Theorem 1.2 to partial Nash-routings,
helps to establish the upper bound of Theorem 1.3.
1.2. Related work
General congestion games were introduced and studied in [36,41]. The application of game theory in computer science,
specifically the notion of the price of anarchy was introduced in [27]. Since then, manymodels have been studied which can
be categorized by: the topology of the network; the nature of the player and social costs; the nature of the traffic (atomic
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Fig. 1. A summary of the results on routing games. A vast majority of work has been on the KP model [27] consisting of m parallel links. The asterisked
work ([·]∗) indicates that the analysis is predominantly for some specific network model, (the vast majority of the work is on the parallel link network), or
for a specific choice of player strategy sets (e.g. singleton sets). The double asterisked column (∗∗) indicates that the work is on existence or convergence
to equilibrium, as opposed to quality of equilibria.
or splittable); the nature of the strategy sets; the nature of the equilibria studied (pure or mixed). The work in [27] was the
first to study the price of anarchy ( PoA for parallel link networks (the KP model), obtaining a result of 32 . Since then, there
has been an abundance of literature on the KP model, obtaining near optimal bounds on the price of anarchy and the price
of stability. The tables in Fig. 1 serve this work. For instance, [13] gives tight bounds, PoA = O( logmlog logm ) (identical links), and
PoA = O( logmlog log logm ) (arbitrary links). The first general result for splittable flowwith sumplayer and social costs came in [44],
in which they showed the tight bound that PoA ≤ 43 . Our results are similar in spirit except that it considers the maximum
player and social costs and our bounds depend on the topology of the network and are tight to within a square root factor. A
brief taxonomy of some relevant existing results, according to the kind of flow (atomic or splittable) and equilibria (mixed
or pure), and according to the social cost SC and player cost pc (sum or maximum), are shown in the following two tables
in Fig. 1.
Typically, the research in the literature has focused on computing upper and lower bounds on the price of anarchy. The
vast majority of the work on maximum social cost has been for parallel link networks, with only a few recent results on
general topologies [10,11,42]. Essentially, all of the work has focused on the sum player cost, which corresponds to the sum
of the edge-congestions on a path (as opposed to the maximum edge-congestion on the path, which we consider here).
Further, the social cost is typically also the sum of congestions along the edges.
We have recently become aware of the work in [6] which is close to our work and was published independently from
our work. In [6] the authors consider the maximum congestion metric in general networks with splittable and atomic flow
where they examine the convergence to equilibria and their efficiency. They prove the existence and non-uniqueness of
equilibria in both the splittable and atomic flowmodels. For the atomic case they show that best response dynamics always
converge and the price of stability is 1 (we prove similar results here). They also prove that finding the best Nash equilibrium
that minimizes the social cost is an NP-hard problem. Further, they show that the price of anarchy may be unbounded for
specific edge-congestion functions (these are functions of the number of paths that use the edge). If the edge-congestion
function is polynomial with degree p then they bound the price of anarchy with O(mp), where m is the number of edges in
the graph. In our workwe use p = 1 and our result in Theorem 1.2 can give a similar upper bound O(m), since themaximum
path length ` cannot exceed m. However, since ` may be smaller than m, our result can give tighter upper bounds on the
price of anarchy. Further, our result in Theorem 1.3 can give tighter price of anarchy bounds too, since the square of the
maximum edge-simple cycle may be smaller than m. In the splittable case it is shown in [6] that if the users always follow
paths with low congestion then the equilibrium achieves optimal social cost.
Another result for general networks which has a brief discussion of the maximum player cost is [31] where the authors
focus on parallel link networks, but also give some results for general topologies on convergence to equilibria. In [31], the
main content is to establish the existence of pure Nash-routings.
Our work has been recently extended in [9]. That paper considers a model with routing classes Q1, . . . ,Qψ , where each
class j has a service cost Sj. Each path belongs to exactly one routing class. The player i cost function is Ci + Si, where Si is
the cost of the service class of the path of i, and Ci is the congestion experienced by player i by considering only the paths in
the same service class. The social cost function is the maximum player cost. It is shown in [9] that such games stabilize with
best response dynamics and the price of stability is 1. The price of anarchy is bounded by O(min(C∗, S∗) · ψ log n), where
C∗+S∗ is the optimal social cost. Such games can be used to provide approximations to the social cost function C+D (recall
that D is the path dilation).
Outline of paper
In Section2wegive somebasic definitions.Weprove Theorem1.1 in Section3.We continuewith theproof of Theorem1.2
in Section 4. The lower bound of Theorem 1.3 is proven in Section 5. In the same section we prove the upper bound of
Theorem 1.3 for 2-connected graphs. We give the general version of the upper bound in Section 6. We conclude with a
discussion in Section 7.
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2. Definitions
An instanceR of a routing (congestion) game is a tuple (N,G, {Pi}i∈N), where:
• N = {1, 2, . . . ,N} are the players,
• G = (V , E) is an undirected connected graph with |V | = n,
• Pi is a collection of edge-simple paths for player i (where in an edge-simple path edges do not repeat but nodes may
repeat). Each path in Pi is a path in G that has the same source si ∈ V and destination ti ∈ V . Note that Pi could be any
set of edge-simple paths between si and ti. (For example Pi may consist of all the edge-simple paths from si to ti, or it
may consist of any subset of these edge-simple paths.)
Each path in Pi is a pure strategy available to player i. A pure strategy profile p = [p1, p2, · · · , pN ] is a collection of pure
strategies (paths), one for each player, where pi ∈ Pi. We refer to a pure strategy profile as a routing. On a finite network, a
routing game is necessarily a finite game.
For any routing p and any edge e ∈ E, the edge-congestion Ce(p) is the number of paths in p that use edge e. For any
path p, the path-congestion Cp(p) is the maximum edge-congestion over all edges in p, Cp(p) = maxe∈p Ce(p). The network
congestion is the maximum edge-congestion over all edges in E, that is, C(p) = maxe∈E Ce(p). The social or global cost is
the network congestion C(p). The player or local cost pci(p) for player i is her path-congestion, pci(p) = Cpi(p). When the
context is clear, we will drop the dependence on p and use Ce, Cp, C, SC, pci.
We use the standard notation p−i to refer to the collection of paths {p1, · · · , pi−1, pi+1, · · · , pN}, and (pi; p−i) as an
alternative notation for p which emphasizes the dependence on pi. Player i is locally-optimal in routing p if pci(p) ≤
pci(p′i; p−i) for all paths p′i ∈ Pi; that is, the player does not wish to change its current path, since every alternative path
does not yield a lower cost. A routing p is in a Nash Equilibrium (p is a Nash-routing) if every player is locally-optimal.
Nash-routings quantify the notion of a stable selfish outcome.
A routing p∗ is an optimal pure strategy profile if it hasminimumattainable social cost: for any other pure strategy profile
p, C(p∗) ≤ C(p). We quantify the quality and diversity of the Nash-routings by the price of stability (PoS) and the price of
anarchy (PoA) (sometimes referred to as the coordination ratio). Let T denote the set of distinct Nash-routings, and let C∗
denote the social cost of an optimal routing p∗ (namely, C∗ = C(p∗)). Then,
PoS = inf
p∈ T
C(p)
C∗
, PoA = sup
p∈ T
C(p)
C∗
.
3. Existence of optimal Nash-routings
The goal in this section is to establish Theorem1.1. For routingp, the congestion vector C(p) = [m0(p),m1(p),m2(p), . . .],
where each component mk(p) is the number of edges with congestion k. Note that
∑
kmk(p) = m, where m is the
number of edges in the network. The social cost (network congestion) SC(p) is the maximum k for which mk > 0. We
define a lexicographic total order on routings as follows. Let p and p′ be two routings, with C(p) = [m0,m1,m2, . . .], and
C(p′) = [m′0,m′1,m′2 . . .]. Two routings are equal, written p=c p′, if and only if mk = m′k for all k ≥ 0; p<c p′ if and only if
there is some k∗ such thatmk∗ < m′k∗ and ∀k > k∗, mk = m′k.
Let (N,G, {Pi}i∈N) be an instance of a routing game. Since there are only finitely many routings (as a player’s path may
use any edge at most once), there exists at least one minimum routing w.r.t. the total order<c . There may be many distinct
routings all of which are minimum (and have equal congestion vectors). Let p∗ be a minimum routing (which exists); then,
for all routings p, p∗≤c p. Every minimum routing is optimal; indeed, if SC(p) < SC(p∗) for some other routing p, then the
maximum index k for whichmk(p) > 0 is smaller than the corresponding index k for p∗, contradicting the fact that p∗≤c p.
Fact 3.1. Every minimum routing (at least one exists) is optimal.
A greedy move is available to player i if she can obtain a lower path-congestion by changing her current path from pi to p′i –
the greedy move takes the original routing p = (pi; p−i) to p′ = (p′i; p−i) in which pi is replaced by p′i .
Lemma 3.2. If a greedy move by any player takes p to p′, then p′<c p.
Proof. Suppose that a greedy move by player i takes p to p′, and so Cp′i (p
′) < Cpi(p). Let k = Cpi(p). Since only player
i has changed his path, the only edges with higher congestion in p′ than in p are edges on the path p′i . Some edges on pi
decreased in congestion by 1 as a result of the greedy move. In particular, all edges of congestion k on pi have decreased in
congestion by 1, since all edges on p′i have final congestion less than k. Thus,mk(p′) ≤ mk(p)− 1, since at least one edge of
congestion k dropped in congestion and no new edges reached congestion k. To conclude that p′<c p, we note that no edge
with congestion greater than k has been affected by the greedy move, hencemj(p′) = mj(p) for all j > k. 
Thus, a greedy move decreases the number of high congestion edges, by transferring the congestion to lower congestion
edges. Since there are only a finite number of routings, every best response dynamic is finite. By Lemma 3.2, no player can
have an available greedy move at a minimum routing, as this would contradict the minimality of the routing. Hence,
Lemma 3.3. Every minimum routing is an optimal Nash-routing.
Hence, PoS = 1. Theorem 1.1 now follows from Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3.
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4. Path length bound on price of anarchy
Here, we prove Theorem 1.2. In order to do so we will use the edge-expansion process, that we introduce here. Before we
describe this technique we need to give some necessary definitions.
Let R = (N,G, {Pi}i∈N) be an instance of a routing game. Let P = ⋃i∈N Pi. The path-length of R is ` = maxp∈P |p|. A
path-cut for player i is a set of edges Ei such that every path in Pi must use at least one of the edges in Ei. The congestion of
a path-cut, denotedW (Ei) is the minimum congestion of any edge in Ei,W (Ei) = mine∈Ei Ce. We have:
Lemma 4.1. Let p = [p1, p2, · · · , pN ] be a routing for which player i is locally-optimal. Then, there is a path-cut Ei for player i
with congestion W (Ei) ≥ pci − 1.
Proof. Since player i is locally-optimal, every path inPimust have path-congestion at least pci−1. Indeed, if not, then there
is a path p′i ∈ Pi with path-congestion at most pci − 2. If player i switches from pi to p′i , his cost is at most pci − 1, which
contradicts pi being locally-optimal for i. For every path p ∈ Pi, let edge e(p) ∈ p be an edge with maximum congestion on
p (C(e) ≥ pci − 1). Let Ei = ∪p∈Pie(p). Since Ei contains at least one edge from every path in Pi, it is a path-cut for player i
and every edge in Ei has congestion at least pci − 1. Thus,W (Ei) ≥ pci − 1. 
4.1. Edge-expansion process
If only some players are locally-optimal in a routing p, then we say that p is a partial Nash-routing. Note that a Nash-
routing is a special case of a partial Nash-routing. The edge-expansion process that we describe below applies to any partial
Nash-routing.
Suppose routing p has network congestion C , and suppose that at least one player is locally-optimal with player cost C .
Let E0 be the set of edges with congestion C0 = C that are used by at least one locally-optimal player, and let Π0 be the
set of these locally-optimal players that use at least one edge in E0. By Lemma 4.1, each player in Π0 has a path-cut with
congestion at least C0 − 1. Let E1 denote the union of E0 with all these path-cuts of every player in Π0. Thus, E0 ⊆ E1 and
each edge in E1 has congestion at least C1 = C0− 1. LetΠ1 denote the set of locally-optimal players whose paths in p use at
least one edge in E1. Note thatΠ0 ⊆ Π1. Each player inΠ1 has player cost at least C1, since every edge in E1 has congestion
at least C1.
We repeat this process as follows. Suppose that for i ≥ 1, edge set Ei has been constructed as the union of Ei−1 with
path-cuts for the players in Πi−1, thus every edge in Ei has congestion at least Ci = Ci−1 − 1 = C − i. We now construct
Πi, the set of locally-optimal players whose paths use at least one edge in Ei; every player in Πi has player cost at least Ci.
By Lemma 4.1, each player inΠi has a path-cut with congestion Ci − 1, and we construct Ei+1 to be the union of Ei with all
these path-cuts of the players inΠi.
Using this inductive-like construction, we obtain a sequence of edge sets, E0 ⊆ E1 ⊆ E2, . . ., withW (Ej) ≥ Cj = C − j,
and corresponding to each edge set, a set of locally-optimal players Π0 ⊆ Π1 ⊆ Π2 · · · . We continue this inductive-like
construction up to edge setEswhich is the first set forwhich |Es| ≤ 2|Es−1|.Wewill refer to this process as the edge-expansion
process.
4.2. Edge-expansion properties
Since |Ei| ≤ 12n2 and each expansion at least doubles the size of the edge set,
Lemma 4.2. |Es| ≥ 2s−1 and 1 ≤ s < 2 log n.
Proof. If s = 1 there is nothing to prove, so assume that s > 1. Since |Ek| > 2|Ek−1| for k = 1, . . . , s−1, |Ek| > 2k|E0|. Since
|E0| ≥ 1, we have |Ek| > 2k. By construction, Ei−1 ⊆ Ei, for 1 ≤ i ≤ s; thus, |Es| ≥ |Es−1| ≥ 2s−1. Since |Es| ≤ |E| < 12n2,
2s−1 < 12n
2 implying s < 2 log n. 
In routing p, let F(C ′) ⊆ N denote the set of non-locally-optimal players with player cost at least C ′. We now establish a
relationship between the congestion of a partial Nash-routing and the optimal routing.
Lemma 4.3. C < 2` · (C∗ + |F(C − 2 log n)|)+ 2 log n.
Proof. From the edge-expansion process, each edge in Es−1 has congestion at least Cs−1. LetM be the number of times edges
in Es−1 are used by the paths in p. Then,M > Cs−1 · |Es−1|. By construction, in p, the congestion in each of the edges of Es−1
is caused only by the players in A = Πs−1 ∪ B, where B ⊆ F(Cs−1) contains the non-locally-optimal players that use edges
in Es−1. Since path lengths are at most `, each player in A can use at most ` edges in Es−1. Hence, Cs−1 · |Es−1| < M ≤ ` · |A|.
Since, |A| ≤ |Πs−1| + |F(Cs−1)|, we obtain, Cs−1 < `|Es−1| · (|Πs−1| + |F(Cs−1)|).We now bound |Πs−1|.
Es contains a path-cut for every player in Πs−1, and every such players must use at least one edge in Es in any routing,
including the optimal routing p∗. Thus, edges in Es are used at least |Πs−1| times, hence some edge is used at least |Πs−1|/|Es|
times, by the pigeonhole principle. Hence, C∗ ≥ |Πs−1|/|Es| (note that |Es| > 0). By the definition of s, |Es| ≤ 2|Es−1|. Hence,
|Πs−1| ≤ 2|Es−1|C∗, and Cs−1 < 2` ·
(
C∗ + |F(Cs−1)|2|Es−1|
)
. Since Cs−1 = C − (s − 1) and 2|Es−1| ≥ 2s (Lemma 4.2), we obtain
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C < 2` ·
(
C∗ + |F(C−s+1)|2s
)
+ s − 1. To conclude, 2s ≥ 2, and note that C ′′ < C ′ implies F(C ′) ⊆ F(C ′′), hence |F(C ′)| is
non-increasing in C ′. Thus, |F(C − s+ 1)| ≤ |F(C − 2 log n)|. 
Since in a Nash-routing, |F(C ′)| = 0, ∀C ′ > 0, by dividing the result of Lemma 4.3 with C∗, we obtain Theorem 1.2.
5. Basic cycle bounds on price of anarchy
Here, we first give the lower bound (part (i)) of Theorem1.3 for the price of anarchy;we then prove the upper bound (part
(ii)) of Theorem 1.3, for the special case of 2-connected graphs. The next result establishes the lower bound of Theorem 1.3.
Lemma 5.1. For any graph G, there is a routing game with PoA ≥ κe(G)− 1.
Proof. Let Q = e1, . . . , eκe be an edge-simple cycle in Gwith length κe. We construct a routing gamewith κe players, where
player i corresponds to edge ei = (ui, vi) in Q , that is, the source of i is si = ui and the destination ti = vi. The strategy set
of i is the collection of all edge-simple paths from si to ti.
There are two special paths in the strategy set of player i, the forward pathwhich is composed solely of the edge (ui, vi),
and the backward path which consists of the remaining edges of cycle Q . Since Q is edge simple, if every player uses his
forward pathC = 1. Thus, the optimal social cost is 1. If on the other hand, all the players use their backward paths (backward
routing p¯), then player i uses every edge inQ except ei exactly once. Thus, the congestion on every edge inQ isN−1 = κe−1.
Hence, if p¯ is a Nash-routing, then PoA ≥ κe − 1.
We will show that p¯ is a Nash-routing by contradiction. Suppose that some player k is not locally-optimal — so player k
has lower congestion for some other path p. Since every edge on Q has congestion κe− 1 in routing p¯, at least κe− 2 players
other than player k use every edge on Q . Thus, if p uses any edge on Q , then pck(p; p¯−k) = κe − 1, which does not improve
its cost, so we conclude that p does not use any edge on Q . Therefore, p has length at least 2 (since p 6= ek and G is not a
multi-graph). Thus, replacing ek ∈ Q by p results in a new edge-simple cycleQ ′ that is strictly longer thanQ , a contradiction.
Thus, p¯ is a Nash-routing. 
We now continue with the upper bound on the price of anarchy. An edge-cut of a connected graph G is a set of edges
whose removal from G partition the graph into at least two node-disjoint connected components. A graph G is k-connected
if it is a connected graph whose minimum edge-cut has size at least k. By Menger’s theorem ([35]), G is k-connected if and
only if there are at least k edge-disjoint paths between every two nodes. Let L be the longest edge-simple path length in G.
Lemma 5.2. If G is 2-connected, then κe(G) ≥
√
2L− 32 .
Proof. The proof relies on the observation that the longest path pmust have at least
√
L edges in common with the largest
cycle q, since otherwise, we would be able to construct a larger cycle by combing pieces of p and q.
Let u and v be the respective starting and ending nodes in the longest path in G. Since the min (u, v)-cut has size at least
two, by Menger’s theorem ([35]), there is a pair of edge-disjoint paths p1, p2 from u to v; let l1 ≤ l2 be the lengths of these
paths respectively. Let p be an edge-simple (u, v)-path with length L. Path p can be decomposed into 2z+ 1 path segments,
for some z, as follows,
p = λ0µ1λ1µ2λ2 · · ·µzλz,
where each µi has length at least one and consists only of edges on p1, and each ‘‘excursion’’ λi does not contain any edges
on p1. Since each excursion λi connects two (not necessarily distinct) nodes on p1, it follows that there is an edge-simple
cycle composed of λi together with the segment of p1 between these two nodes. The length of this cycle is at least |λi|, so
we have that κe(G) ≥ |λi| for all i ∈ [0, z]. Since path p is edge simple, there can be at most l1+ 1 excursions (as each of the
κi must contain distinct edges), i.e. z ≤ l1. We now compute the length of p as follows,
L =
z∑
i=0
|λi| +
z∑
i=1
|µi|,
≤
z∑
i=0
κe(G)+
z∑
i=1
|µi|,
≤ κe(G) · (l1 + 1)+ l1.
Solving for κe(G), we have that κe(G) ≥ (L+1)/(l1+1)−1. Since p1 and p2 form an edge-simple cycle, κe(G) ≥ l1+ l2 ≥ 2l1.
Combining these inequalities, we have
κe(G) ≥ max
{
2l1,
L+ 1
l1 + 1 − 1
}
.
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To reach a contradiction, suppose that κe(G) <
√
2L− 32 . Since κe(G) ≥ 2l1, we have l1 <
√
L/2− 34 . Therefore,
κe(G) ≥ L+ 1l1 + 1 − 1,
>
L+ 1√
L/2+ 14
− 1,
= √2L− 32 + ,
where  = 9/(√32L+ 2) > 0. This contradiction concludes the proof. 
Lemma 5.2 bounds the longest edge-simple path length in G with respect to κe(G). Theorem 1.2 bounds the price of
anarchy in terms of the longest path ` in the players’ strategy sets. Since ` ≤ L, we obtain the following result, which proves
the upper bound of Theorem 1.3 for 2-connected graphs:
Lemma 5.3. For any routing game on a 2-connected graph G, PoA ≤ c(κe2(G)+ log n), for some constant c.
6. Cycle upper bound for general graphs
We now prove the upper bound (part (ii)) of Theorem 1.3 for general graphs. We will bound the price of anarchy with
respect to the square of the longest cycle. The main idea behind the result is that any Nash-routing in G can be mapped to
a partial Nash-routing on some 2-connected subgraph of G. In this partial Nash-routing, many players are locally-optimal,
and we can apply Lemma 4.3 in combination with Lemma 5.1 to obtain the result.
6.1. Block-structure of graphs
Consider an arbitrary connected graph G = (V , E). We say that two subgraphs of G are adjacent if the intersection of
their node sets is non-empty. It is easy to verify that G contains a 2-connected subgraph if and only if it is not a tree. In a
2-connected subgraph every pair of nodes is in some edge-simple cycle (this is a trivial property of 2-connected graphs).
A 2-connected subgraph G′ is maximal if there is no larger 2-connected subgraph that contains G′. A maximal 2-connected
subgraph is also known as a block. A bridge is an edge whose removal disconnects G. It is well known how to decompose any
connected graphG into a tree of blocks and bridges known as the block-structure ofG. In particular, we denote byA = (VA, EA)
the subgraph of G consisting of all the blocks, while we denote by B = (VB, EB) the subgraph of G consisting of all the bridges.
Let A1, . . . , Aα be the blocks of A, where α ≥ 1, and Ai = (VAi , EAi). Clearly, any two subgraphs Ai and Aj, i 6= j, are not
adjacent since otherwise their union would be 2-connected, which contradicts their maximality. Subgraph B consists of one
or more disjoint maximal connected components (each containing at least two nodes), which we will denote B1, . . . , Bβ .
We will refer to the Ai as the type-a blocks of G and to the Bi as the type-b blocks of G (here we abuse notation since the Bi are
not really blocks). Clearly, the type-b blocks are trees. Note that only blocks of different types can be adjacent, since both
the type-a and type-b blocks have a maximality property. Moreover, any pair of type-a and type-b blocks can have at most
one common node, since otherwise we would be able to construct edge-simple cycles involving nodes in type-a and type-b
blocks, which would contradict the maximality of the type-a blocks.
We now define a simple bipartite graph H = (VH , EH) that represents the block-structure of G. In VH = {a1, . . . , aα,
b1, . . . , bβ} the nodes ai, bj correspond to the type-a block Ai and the type-b block Bj, respectively. Edge (ai, bj) ∈ EH if and
only if the blocks Ai and Bj are adjacent. The bipartition for H is (A,B), whereA = {a1, . . . , aα} andB = {b1, . . . , bβ}. The
nodes in H inherit the same type as their corresponding blocks in G. Since G is connected, it follows immediately that H is
connected too. Furthermore, H is a tree and we will refer to it as the block-tree of G.
6.1.1. Block-subpaths
A node in G can belong to at most one type-a block and one type-b block (possibly simultaneously), since no two blocks
of the same type are adjacent. If a node is a member of one block, then we define its type to be the same with the type of the
block. If a node belongs to two blocks then we define it to be of type-a (we assign it to the type-a block). An edge belongs to
exactly one block and inherits the type of that block.
Let p = v1, v2, . . . , vk, k > 1, be an edge-simple path in G. We canwrite p as a concatenation of subpaths p = q1q2 · · · qr ,
where r ≥ 1, and |qi| > 0, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , r}, with the following properties: (i) the subpaths are edge disjoint; (ii) all the nodes
of a subpath qi are in the same block and have the same type (which will also be the type and block of qi); (iii) the types of
the subpaths alternate, i.e. the types of qi and qi+1 are different; (iv) there is no type-a subpath with one node (any type-a
subpath with one node can be merged with two adjacent type-b subpaths in the same type-b block). We refer to the qi as
the block-subpaths of p. Note that there is a unique block-subpath decomposition for path p.
Since graph H is a tree, and the type-b blocks are also trees, it can be shown that any two edge-simple paths from the
same source node to the same destination nodes have to go through the same sequence of type-b edges. Thus, we have:
Lemma 6.1. Any two edge-simple paths from nodes s to t in G use the same sequence of type-b edges.
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6.2. Subgames in blocks
Consider a routing gameR = (N,G, {Pi}i∈N) in G. Let p be a routingwith network congestion C . Let p∗ denote an optimal
routing for R with congestion C∗. An immediate consequence of Lemma 6.1 is that every path in p uses the same type-b
edges as its corresponding path in p∗, hence:
Lemma 6.2. Any type-b edge e has the same congestion in p and p∗, i.e. Ce(p) = Ce(p∗) ≤ C∗.
By Lemma 6.2, all the edges in pwith congestion higher than C∗ must occur in type-a subpaths.
Lemma 6.3. For path p, if Cp(p) > C∗, then p must have a type-a subpath q with Cq(p) = Cp(p).
Suppose now that p is an arbitrary Nash-routing which has network congestion C . For a type-a block Λ, let pΛ =
{p1, . . . , pγ } denote the paths in p that use edges in Λ, and denote the respective users as NΛ, where |NΛ| = γ . Let QΛ =
{q1, . . . , qγ } denote the type-a block-subpaths of the paths in pΛ that are inΛ (qi is a subpath of pi).
In block Λ, we define a new routing game RΛ = (NΛ,Λ, {PΛi }i∈NΛ), where PΛi contains all the type-a subpaths of Pi
that are inΛ and have the same source and destination as qi. We refer toRΛ as the subgame ofR for blockΛ.QΛ is a possible
routing forRΛ. If qi is locally-optimal for player i inΛ, we say that its corresponding path pi in G is satisfied in subgameRΛ.
In other words, if path pi is satisfied inRΛ, player i does not wish to change the choice qi inΛ. Every player with high player
cost (higher than C∗) must be satisfied in a type-a block, since otherwise it would violate Lemma 6.3. Thus:
Lemma 6.4. If player i has path pi and pci > C∗, then player i is satisfied in some subgameRΛ in a type-a blockΛ, and player i
has congestion pci inΛ.
Proof. We show that if the claim is false, then path pi is not locally-optimal for player i inR, contradicting the fact that p is
a Nash-routing. Indeed, we know from Lemma 6.3 that pi uses type-a blocks. If none of these type-a block-subpaths are not
locally-optimal for their respective subgames, then they can all be switched in favor of paths with strictly lower congestion
than C . This will give a valid path for player i with strictly lower congestion than C , hence pi is not locally-optimal for
player i. 
6.3. Main result
Consider routing game R = (N,G, {Pi}i∈N) in G and a Nash-routing p with congestion C(p) = C . Lemma 6.4, implies
that each user is satisfied in some type-a block (not necessarily the same). In any type-a block, the resulting routing in the
subgame may be a partial Nash-routing, since some users may not be satisfied in it. We first show that there is a block with
high congestion where the number of unsatisfied players is bounded. For a type-a blockΛ, let FΛ(C ′) denote the set of non-
locally-optimal players in the subgameRΛ whose congestion inR is at least C ′. We will use CΛ to denote the congestion in
the blockΛ. We have:
Lemma 6.5. Suppose that C > C∗+ x(1+log n) for some x > 0. Then, there is a type-a blockΛwith congestion CΛ ≥ C−x log n
and |FΛ(CΛ − x)| ≤ 2C∗.
Proof. Let fΛ = |FΛ(CΛ − x)|, and suppose that C > C∗ + x(1+ log n). Assume, that every type-a blockΛwith congestion
CΛ ≥ C − x log n has fΛ > 2C∗. Since p is a Nash-routing, every player with congestion C > C∗ is locally-optimal in at least
one type-a subgame ofR (Lemma 6.4). Thus, there is at least one type-a block Λ1 with CΛ1 = C . We will now root H (the
block-tree of G) at the type-a node a1 which corresponds to Λ1 and define a type-a tree Ha composed only of the type-a
nodes in H . The root of Ha is alsoΛ1. By assumption, fΛ1 > 2C
∗. Since C − x > C∗ + x log n, these fΛ1 players which are not
locally-optimal in subgameRΛ1 have congestion at least C − x and are locally-optimal in some other subgame. Therefore,
their paths leaveΛ1 and enter some other type-a block. We introduce the following auxiliary claim:
Claim 6.6. If K paths leave a type-a blockΛ, they must use at least d K/C∗ e distinct edges out ofΛ.
Proof. If not, then one of the exit edges (which is a type-b edge) will have congestion greater than C∗, contradicting
Lemma 6.2. 
We now build the rooted tree Ha in an inductive-like way as follows. The root node is a1. Suppose that α is a node in Ha
corresponding to type-a blockΛ, with the following two properties:
(i) CΛ − x > C∗;
(ii) fΛ = |FΛ(CΛ − x)| > 2C∗.
Then, we define three potential children for α as follows. Since there are fΛ > 2C∗ players with congestion at least CΛ − x
> C∗ which are not locally-optimal in subgameRΛ, these fΛ playersmust be locally-optimal in some other subgame. There-
fore all these fΛ paths leaveΛ and proceed to their respective subgames where they are locally-optimal with congestion at
least CΛ − x. By Claim 6.6, they use at least three distinct type-b edges e1, e2, e3 in leaving Λ (note that these three edges
may be in the same type-b block, but this will not affect the argument). Let p1, p2, p3 be three paths with congestion at least
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CΛ − x that exitΛ on the edges e1, e2, e3 respectively and continue on to their respective blocksΛ1,Λ2,Λ3 in which they
are locally-optimal. At least two of these blocks correspond to nodes that are not the parent (if it exists) of α in Ha; these
two nodes are two children c1(α) and c2(α) of α in Ha (if more than two of these children are different from the parent, we
arbitrarily pick two). The depth of a child is one greater than the depth of its parent (the depth of the root is 0). The next few
claims give some properties of Ha that will be needed to complete the proof of the lemma.
Claim 6.7. Ha is a tree.
Proof. Ha is connected, by construction. Suppose that Ha contains a node-simple cycle. By construction, an edge be-
tween nodes α1, α2 in Ha implies the existence of an edge-simple path which leaves one type-a block and enters the
second. Hence, there is a path that leaves a type-a block (say Ai) and re-enters it. This path can be made edge simple
by removing all cycles. Thus, block Ai is not maximally 2-connected, since it can be augmented with nodes on the
path which are not members of Ai, a contradiction. 
The nodes in Ha can be viewed as constructed level by level. Each node in Ha that satisfies the two conditions above has
exactly two children. Note that a1 satisfies these two conditions, initiating the construction of Ha. The nodes in Ha which
do not satisfy the conditions (i) and (ii) are leaves. Thus all nodes in Ha are either leaves or have two children. We use the
following claim:
Claim 6.8. A node at depth d ≤ log n cannot be a leaf.
Proof. Let α be a node at depth d, corresponding to type-a block Λ. We show that CΛ ≥ C − d · x by induction on
d. Certainly when d = 0, the claim holds since CΛ1 = C . Consider d > 0. The parent ofΛ, ParΛ, has depth d− 1, so
CParΛ ≥ C−(d−1)x, by the induction hypothesis. Since d−1 ≤ log n, by assumption fParΛ > 2C∗ and by construction
of the children in Ha,Λ is a block in which some player is locally-optimal in the subgameRΛ and has congestion at
least CParΛ − x ≥ C − (d− 1) · x+ x. Therefore, CΛ ≥ C − d · x.
Since d ≤ log n, we conclude that CΛ − x ≥ C − x(1 + log n) > C∗ by assumption in the statement of the the-
orem. Thus, condition (i) is satisfied for α to have children. Since CΛ ≥ C − x log n, by assumption fΛ > 2C∗, hence
condition (ii) is satisfied for α to have children. Since both conditions are satisfied, α cannot be a leaf node. 
We are now ready to conclude the proof of the lemma by obtaining a contradiction. Since Ha must have a leaf node, we
conclude that the depth of Ha is at least 1+ log n. Since every node at depth at most log n has 2 children, we conclude that
Ha has at least 2b1+log nc > 2log n = n leaves. Thus, we have our contradiction since Ha cannot possibly contain more nodes
than G. 
By combining Lemma 4.3 and Lemma 6.5 we obtain the following result which establishes the upper bound of
Theorem 1.3.
Lemma 6.9. PoA ≤ c · (κe2(G)+ log2 n), for some constant c.
Proof. Let x = 2 log n. If C ≤ C∗+ x(1+ log n), then there is nothing to prove because C/C∗ ≤ 1+ 2 log n(1+ log n)/C∗ ≤
c log2 n, for some generic constant c . So, suppose that C > C∗ + x(1 + log n). By Lemma 6.5, there exists a type-a block Λ
such that CΛ ≥ C − 2 log2 n and |FΛ(CΛ − 2 log n)| ≤ 2C∗. By applying Lemma 4.3 to the subgameRΛ we obtain,
CΛ < 2` ·
(
C∗Λ + |FΛ(CΛ − 2 log n′)|
)+ 2 log n′,
where ` is the length of the longest edge-simple path in the player strategy sets inRΛ, n′ is the number of nodes inΛ and
C∗Λ is the optimal congestion for the subgame RΛ. Note that n′ ≤ n, and the subgame RΛ cannot have a higher optimal
congestion than the full gameR, hence C∗ ≥ C∗Λ. Since |FΛ| is monotonically non-increasing (FΛ(C ′) ⊆ FΛ(C ′′) for C ′′ < C ′),
we have that:
C − 2 log2 n < 2` · (C∗ + |FΛ(CΛ − 2 log n)|)+ 2 log n ≤ 2` · (C∗ + 2C∗)+ 2 log n.
From Lemma 5.2, ` ≤ cκe2(Λ) ≤ cκe2(G), and so C ≤ c · (κe2(G)C∗ + log2 n). After dividing by C∗, we obtain the desired
result. 
7. Discussion
All our results have been stated for paths that are edge simple. Specifically the strategy set for the players is a set of edge-
simple paths and the social and player costs are the maximum edge-congestion in the network and player path respectively.
However, exactly analogous results can be obtained for strategy sets containing node-simple pathswith the social and player
costs being the maximum node-congestion in the network and player path respectively. In this case, the bounds on the price
of anarchy are in terms of the node-cycle number (the length of the longest node-simple cycle).
We believe that the price of anarchy upper bound can be improved tomatch the lower bound. Specifically, we leave open
the following conjecture: for any routing game, PoA ≤ κe−1. An interesting future direction is to obtain similar results when
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the latency functions at each link are more general and not necessarily identical, that is, the network graph is weighted or
the edge congestion functions are nonlinear.
Another problem is to study the convergence time to Nash equilibria. It is shown in [6] that computing the best Nash
equilibriumwith optimal social cost is an NP-hard problem. A question remains about the complexity of finding an arbitrary
Nash equilibrium. The optimization problem of computing an optimal coordinated solution that minimizes the social cost
can be solved in polynomial time by using a simple flow approach (this method was proposed by one of the reviewers of
this paper):
Let G = (V , E) be a graph and (s1, t1), . . . , (sN , tN) be the source-sink pairs of the players. Now construct a network
GK , where K is a parameter. Each edge in G receives capacity K . Add two additional vertices s, t , and add the edges
(s, si), (ti, t) for (i = 1, . . . ,N) with respective capacity one. Now find the smallest integer K such that GK admits a
(maximum) s-t-flow with value equal to N . This can be done in polynomial time (with binary search). Moreover, as
the capacities are integers, we can augment the flow always integrally, which yields that the flow on any edge is equal
to the number of players using it.
The optimization problem of minimizing the maximum congestion has also been studied in the context of oblivious routing
[5,8,23,40]. It is an interesting problem to investigate whether such methods of computing optimal coordinated solutions
can be extended to compute Nash equilibria.
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